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RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973
-Federal Regulation and Support of Prepaid
Group Health Care Plans-Preemption of Restrictive State Laws and Practices
I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 29, 1973, President Richard Nixon signed into
law the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973.' As an alternative to the traditional fee-for-service, sole-practitioner method of
health care, 2 this act provides for affirmative federal regulation and
financial support of the health maintenance organization (HMO)
concept. It is a response to the prediction that the delivery of health
care in the United States will be in dire need of government and
private aid to avert a total breakdown. 3 The symptoms of the present health-care crisis include tremendous increases in the cost of
health care, a scarcity of physicians and medical facilities, inefficient use and allocation of available medical resources, and a distressing lack of quality in the services offered.4 Although the prepaid
group health care plan is not a novel approach to the impending
crisis in delivery of medical services, the development of HMOs has
been hindered seriously by restrictive state laws and practices.5 The
instant federal legislation is designed to aid significantly the development of prepaid group health care by providing financial assis1. Pub. L. No. 93-222 (Dec. 29, 1973), 87 Stat. 914, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.

(1970), as printed in 1973 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& ADMIN. Naws 5129-56.

2. According to the traditional fee-for-service concept, a patient contacts an individual
physician who provides health care for a fee that is determined by the time spent and the
type of service performed. If the patient's needs are beyond the physician's capabilities
(knowledge, time, facilities), the physician will refer him to another source of care (physician,
hospital, clinic).
3. See Finch & Egeberg, Report to the President,cited in U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT,
July 21, 1969, at 9.
4. See Holley & Carlson, The Legal Context for the Development of Health Maintenance Organizations, 24 STAN. L. REV. 644, 646-47 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Holley &
Carlson]; Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis,
84 HARv. L. REv. 887, 891-901 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note]. See generally Symposium
- Health Care, 35 LAw & CONEnmp. PROB. 229 (1970).
5. See Rothfeld, Sensible Surgery for Swelling Medical Costs, 119 CONG. Rac. S6934,
S6935 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1973).
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tance to qualified HMOs and preempting restrictive state regulations.'
II.

WHAT ARE

HMOsT

A health maintenance organization is a legal entity that accepts
the responsibility and risk of providing comprehensive health care
services in return for fixed periodic payments. The volunteering
patient-enrollee pays without regard to the number of visits or the
type and extent of services actually rendered by the HMO. Rather,
the fee is based on the cost of the services required by the whole
community enrolled in the HMO. These services are comprehensive, including hospital, clinic, and home visits, but the benefits
offered vary with the particular needs of the community. The health
care is provided by a team of physicians who are employed by the
HMO and who typically use centralized facilities and supplies, thus
giving the client easy, one-source access to these services. The physicians are compensated on a prearranged distribution from the
pooled income as opposed to the fee-for-service basis.
Although the term "HMO" is relatively new, organizations
with these characteristics have been in existence for over forty
years.8 Today, approximately eight million clients are served by
these organizations.' 0 Although these entities, collectively referred
to as HMOs, have a variety of forms and sponsors," the overwhelm6.

See Pub. L. No. 93-222, § 1311 (Dec. 29, 1973), 87 Stat. 931, as printed in 1973 U.S.
5150-51.
7. The sources for the following general definitional account of HMOs are: Havighurst,
Health Maintenance Organizationsand the Market for Health Services, 35 LAw & CoNTrEMP.
PaOB. 716, 718-24 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Havighurst]; Holley & Carlson, supra note 4,
at 648-53; Morris, HMO (Horrendous Malpractice Obituary), 39 INs. CoUN. J. 518 (1972);
Note, supra note 4, at 901-18; Phelan, Erickson & Fleming, Group PracticePrepayment:An
Approach to Delivering Organized Health Services, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoa. 796, 797-803
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Phelan].
8. See Rothfeld, Sensible Surgery for Swelling Medical Costs, 119 CONG. REc. S6934,
S6935 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1973).
9. Id. at S6934.
10. Among the more famous and successful organizations are Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan (California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, Colorado and Ohio), Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (Washington), Group Health Association, Inc. of Washington, D.C.,
Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York, and Ross-Loos Medical Group (California). See
Note, supra note 4, at 910-18; Phelan, supra note 7, at 805-08; S. REP. No. 129, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1973).
11. See Note, supra note 4, at 910-18. The largest entity, Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, is composed of an administrative corporation that contracts for health services with
both a hospital service corporation that owns hospitals and regional physician groups. This
tripartite organization stresses centralized control and efficiency. The Health Insurance Plan
of Greater New York (HIP) is purely an administrative entity. Unlike Kaiser, it contracts with
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
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ing majority of established and proposed HMOs are nonprofit organizations. 2 There has been a continuing debate, however, over the
appropriateness of a profit-making enterprise in the health care
area. 13 Advocates of the profit-making form contend that it provides
needed sources of capital for the development and maintenance of
HMOs; however, there are fears that the profit motive will shift the
physicians' allegiance away from the patient to the organization and
its goal of economization.'4
The continued interest in HMOs can be traced to the distinct
advantages of this type of health-care organization. The major advantage is its stress on preventive medicine. Faced with the task of
balancing variable costs with a fixed income, these organizations
emphasize early detection and prevention of prolonged illnesses that
otherwise would require costly services. 5 This approach also avoids
the built-in economic pressure on physicians to perform unnecessary services for clients who are paying on a fee-for-service basis.
Thus a client's treatment more likely will be based on his health
rather than his ability to pay. 6 Although there is a possibility that
the quality of care will suffer due to cost pressures, these same
pressures induce the organization to use its facilities and referral
services efficiently, thereby assuring the client of more continuous,
nonduplicative attention.17 The goal of efficiency, which requires
organization, also promotes easier access to health care for consumers. Instead of the extremely inefficient fragmentation existing in
traditional health-care delivery, 8 the HMO concept provides access
to comprehensive health services from a single entity, with various
independent medical group partnerships that, in turn, contract for hospital services on an
individual basis. This decentralized approach is dependent on independent contractors and
affects the plan's efficiency and economy. Thus HIP is beginning to provide its own centralized services. The Ross-Loos Medical Group of Los Angeles is the oldest and largest
physician-run plan. Its enrollment is largely employment related. This plan provides most of
its own services, but hospitalization is provided by independent hospitals reimbursed by the
plan's own insurance.
12. Id. at 918.
13. See Hearings on S. 1182 Before a Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. of
Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 157-61, 469-72 (1971).
14. See Havighurst, supra note 7, at 748-59.
15. According to a survey of health costs by the Health Manpower Commission of the
U.S. Public Health Service, cited in Zak, ComprehensivePrepaidHealth Care-Why?, 117
CONG. Rec. 4416 (1971), during 1960-65 the Kaiser Foundation required 1.69 hospital beds
per 1000 clients per year and a total of 528 hospital-patient days per 1000 clients per year
while the area fee-for-service hospitals required 3.39 and 891 respectively.
16. Id.
17. See Havighurst, supra note 7, at 720-22.
18. In the present system of sole practitioners, the consumer has many possible sources
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specialists using a central depository of health records.' 9 This consolidation of health-care personnel, facilities, and administration
has resulted in decreased costs for the services rendered." Also, the
physicians have the advantages of the decreased cost of practicing
medicine, internal consultation with colleagues in the HMO, opportunity for a regular work schedule, decreased financial risk in entering medical practice, and more time for continuing their profes21
sional education.
In spite of the apparent viability of HMOs as an alternative to
the traditional fee-for-service system, there are twenty states without any form of HMOs in existence. 2 The major reason, besides the
absence of necessary capital, is the existence of restrictive state laws
and practices.
HI.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF

HMOs2

In response to pressure by organized medicine, various restrictive measures have been enacted by the states to combat the
threats, such as control of health services by laymen and competition for the traditional fee-for-service approach, embodied in prepaid group health care plans. 24 Moreover, contributing to the restrictive climate surrounding the development of HMOs2 5 is a feeling of
uncertainty due to the inconsistent enforcement and interpretation
of these measures by state authorities. 2 The Department of Health,
of health care, often leading to confusion over the proper specialist needed for the situation.
An error in choice leads to referrals that can result in test duplication and misplaced medical
records.
19. See Havighurst, supra note 7, at 721-22.
20. Senator Cranston noted that in a 1967 Health Manpower Commission study for the
period 1960-1965, the per capita medical care costs paid by private consumers in the U.S.
increased 43.5% while the increase for enrollees of Kaiser Foundation was 19.1%. 118 CoNG.
REC. 7971 (1972). For other studies and views on the relative advantages and disadvantages
of HMOs see Hearings on H.R. 5615, 11728 and All IdenticalBills Before the Subcomm. on
Public Health and Environment of the House Comm. on Interstateand ForeignCommerce,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) and Hearings on S. 935, 703, 837, 1182, 1301, 2827, 3327 Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st
& 2d Sess. (1971-72).
21. See S. REP. No. 129, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973).
22. See 119 CoNG. REc. S23430 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1973) (remarks of Senator Javits).
23. See Hansen, Group HealthPlans-A Twenty-Year Legal Review, 42 MINN. L. REV.
527, 531-48 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hansen]; Holley & Carlson, supra note 4, at 653-62;
Comment, Group Health Plans: Some Legal and Economic Aspects, 53 YALE L.J. 162, 16682 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Comment]; Note, supra note 4, at 954-75.
24. See Hansen, supra note 23, at 527-31.
25. This restrictive climate has led such organizations as Kaiser Foundation to consider
the state of the law in a prospective area as an element in expansion decisions. See Note,
supra note 4, at 975.
26. Id. at 964.
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Education and Welfare has estimated that twenty-two states have
specific restrictive statutes while admitting that as many as fortynine states may prohibit HMO development in some manner.27
A.

Restrictive EnablingActs

The purpose of enabling acts in general is to regulate the formation and operation of legal entities. In setting up regulatory statutes
for prepaid group health care plans," the states developed controls
which necessarily would inhibit the development of plans not favored by organized medicine. 29 The various controls imposed include: (1) medical society approval of the plan's articles of incorporation;" (2) medical society sponsorship, or control of directors or
sponsors, of the plan; 3' (3) actual medical society control of the
plan's operations; 32 (4) required membership of an absolute number
of the local physicians; 33 (5) open membership for all physicians who
desire to join; 34 (6) required statutory form of organization;3 and (7)
freedom of an enrollee in the plan to choose any physician, even one
not associated with the plan. 3 These statutes also exempt the plan
from insurance laws and the corporate practice rule, 7 thus further
monopolizing the health care market for organized medicine by subjecting nonqualified (nonfavored) plans to more regulations.3 8 An
extreme restriction is found in a Virginia law which limits competition among HMOs by prohibiting more than one medical and one
surgical plan to exist in a stipulated geographical area unless the
Insurance Commission determines that the public welfare requires
39
more than one plan.
Although many states have statutes that clearly restrict the
27. 118 CONG. REc. S14385 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1972) (cited by Senator Kennedy). Contra,
HMOs as Seen by the AMA - An Analysis, 117 CONG. REc. 47847 (1971) ("probably no real
barriers exist to legal development of HMOs.") (cited by Representative Roy).
28. Approximately 10 states have no enabling legislation for prepaid group health care
plans, although such plans do exist in those states. See Holley & Carlson, supra note 4, at
654 n.43; Note, supra note 4, at 963.
29. See Comment, supra note 23, at 175.
30. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 305 (1958).
31. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 420:7 (Supp. 1972).
32. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1809 (1971).
33. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 514.17 (Supp. 1973).
34. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1814 (Supp. 1973).
35. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-1901 (1973) (nonprofit).
36. See ALAs. STAT. § 2 1.87.160(c) (1966).
37. For a discussion of the corporate practice rule see text accompanying notes 51-59
infra.
38. See Hansen, supra note 23, at 531.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-195.9 (1973).
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development of HMOs, a literal reading of these statutes is often
misleading. 0 Modern advocates of HMOs have devised ways to
evade these restrictive acts, recognizing that they were passed without regard to HMOs by legislators who were sometimes totally ignorant of the method of operation involved. 41 These methods have
included: (1) creating a legal fiction in licensing an HMO (Health
Insurance Plan of Greater New York) under a. medical indemnity
insurance plan statute; (2) obtaining an opinion by a state attorney
general stating that the statutory delegation of approval to the medical society is inoperative because of vagueness and indefiniteness;
and (3) incorporating an HMO under an alternative nonprofit corporation statute.42 Restrictive enabling acts have been attacked directly on constitutional grounds. Statutes that authorize private
groups such as medical societies and hospitals to control the establishment of prepaid group health care plans have been held to be
unconstitutional delegations of legislative power and to violate due
process by not providing adequate safeguards. 3 These piecemeal
reactions to restrictive enabling acts, however, have not provided
the impetus necessary for unanimous modification of all such laws.
B.

Insurance Laws

Insurance laws and regulations present another legal obstacle
to the development of HMOs. By guaranteeing medical services
paid for in advance, HMOs superficially resemble insurance organizations. 4 Regulation by insurance laws has placed great burdens on
prepaid group health care plans, including large financial reserve
requirements, restrictions on the percentage of assets that can be
used for organizational expenses, and unreasonably low rate limitations. 15 These burdens are unreasonable because the main purpose
of HMOs is not to indemnify losses of clients, but to provide medical
services which require large amounts of capital investment." Thus,
these laws are not the appropriate quality-control measures needed
to supervise HMO operations. Fortunately, the courts have recog40. See Note, supra note 4, at 963-64. Contra,Hansen, supranote 23, at 533-34 (finding
a permissive/mandatory dichotomy in enabling acts).
41. See Note, supra note 4, at 964.
42. Id. at 964-66.
43. See Illinois Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Gerber, 18 111. 2d 531, 165 N.E.2d 279 (1960); Group
Health Ins. v. Howell, 43 N.J. 104, 202 A.2d 689 (1964); Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 40 N.J.
436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963); 7 DuQ. L. Rsv. 125, 130-32 (1968).
44. See Hansen, supra note 23, at 536-37.
45. See Note, supra note 4, at 970.
46. Id. at 973.
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nized this distinction and have found that prepaid group health care
plans are not subject to insurance law regulation." In Jordan v.
Group Health Association,4" the leading case in this area, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that risk distribution or assumption was incidental to the other features of Group Health such
as the rendering of a service, a preventive medicine outlook, and a
goal of cost reduction. 9 This judicial reaction, however, may be
limited by a revision of the insurance laws by the legislatures attempting to maintain control over HMOs that successfully evade
enabling acts."
C.

The Common-Law CorporatePracticeRule

The corporate practice rule prohibits licensure of a corporation
for the practice of a learned profession. 5' Based on considerations of
public policy 52 requiring high standards of competency and freedom
of choice for the consumer, and the fear that a physician's loyalty
will favor the corporation over the patient, 53 the rule prevents a
corporation from practicing medicine under licensure statutes requiring personal qualifications of competency. 4 Various arguments
have been advanced to combat the reasoning behind the rule, but
most courts see the physician as an agent for the corporation, and
therefore, under respondeat superior, the corporate principal is
deemed to practice medicine. 5 Nevertheless, while subject to the
rule in theory, a nonprofit corporation has never been held to violate
the corporate practice rule.56 This judicial distinctions is based on
47. See, e.g., Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Note, supra
note 4, at 970.
48. 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
49. Id. at 247.
50. See Holley & Carlson, supra note 4, at 656-57. For continued insurance-type regulation, see, e.g., ALAS. STAT. §§ 21.87.200-.220 (1966).
51. See I W. FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 97 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1963).
52. See, e.g., People ex rel. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp.,
12 Cal. 2d 156, 158-59, 82 P.2d 429, 430 (1938); Batron v. Codington County, 68 S.D. 309,
326-29, 2 N.W.2d 337, 345-46 (1942).
53. See, e.g., People ex reL. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp.,
12 Cal. 2d 156, 158, 82 P.2d 429, 430 (1938).
54. See, e.g., Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 295, 14 P.2d 67, 71
(1932); State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 785, 234 N.W. 260, 262 (1931).
55. See Comment, supra note 23, at 167-68. One argument, for example, characterizes
physicians as independent contractors, not agents for the corporation, thus, the corporation
is not practicing medicine. Id.
56. See Comment, 7 DuQ. L. REv. 125, 128 (1968); Hansen, supra note 23, at 536.
Contra, 7 DuQ. L. REV. supra at 128 n.14 (Ohio attorney general disputed the profit-nonprofit
distinction).
57. See, e.g., United States v. AMA, 110 F.2d 703, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1940), aff'd, 317 U.S.
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the rationale that the public is more likely to suffer if a physician's
loyalty is divided between his patient and the economic needs of the
profit-making corporation.58 Although its impact has been lessened
by the profit-nonprofit distinction, 9 the corporate practice rule has
continued to be a major roadblock for the establishment of HMOs
operated for profit.
D.

Other Restrictions

The growth of HMOs has been hampered further by restrictive
state licensure laws." While these statutes were enacted to ensure
competency, in effect they bar the use of paramedics and curtail the
performance by physicians of tasks complementary and necessary
to their strictly defined areas of qualification. These limitations
frustrate HMO attempts to increase efficiency through labor delegation and substitution.'
An HMO's access to the consumer market has been restricted
by the traditional American Medical Association position against
physician advertising." This position has appeared in state statutes
that ban advertising and revoke licenses of violators.13 For example,
in Missouri, such a statute was applied against an osteopathic physician whose clinic advertised its services. The court held that he
could not accomplish indirectly what he could not do personally."
Although there have been favorable court rulings5 and some liberalization in state statutes,6 the ban on advertising has continued to
plague the growth of HMOs.6 7
Professional restraints also have been imposed by organized
519 (1943); People ex rel. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal.
2d 156, 160, 82 P.2d 429, 431 (1938).
58. See Comment, supra note 23, at 169-71.
59. See Note, supra note 4, at 962.
60. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4731.01 et seq. (Anderson 1954), as amended in
part, §§ 4731.01 et seq. (Anderson Supp. 1972).
61. See Holley & Carlson, supra note 4, at 659-60.
62. Id. at 658.
63. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 334.100(9) (1966).
64. Bittiker v. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts, 404 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Mo.
1966).
65. See Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal. 2d 201, 272
P.2d 497 (1954); Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586,
237 P.2d 737 (1951).
66. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12530(a)(3) (West Supp. 1974).
67. See Holley & Carlson, supra note 4, at 658. Senator Kennedy sees no difference
between HMOs and private insurance plans that advertise for subscribers and then reimburse
fee-for-service physicians, thus acting as agents for the physicians. 119 CONG. REC. S8981
(daily ed. May 14, 1973).
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medicine against physicians who join group health plans instead of
adhering to the traditional fee-for-service approach. 8 The sanctions
threatened or proposed include denial of medical society membership, denial of staff privileges in private hospitals, and general ostracism.69 The result has been reluctance on the part of consumers
and physicians to join a plan considered undesirable by organized
medicine and restriction of the environment needed for HMOs to
compete successfully with the fee-for-service approach. 71 Prepaid
group health care plans have been successful in combating this type
of monopolistic maneuvering by initiating judicial attacks under
federal and state antitrust laws. 7' As a result of these setbacks, the
72
prolonged battle waged by organized medicine has diminished.
IV.

AFFIRMATIVE LAws AND PROPOSALS

The various successes enjoyed by the HMOs in their battle
against restrictive state laws and practices have been local, sporadic
reactions-purely defensive, with no positive commitment on the
part of government officials to promote HMOs as a viable means of
providing health-care services. Also, the various successful evasions
of state regulatory laws have raised fears that HMOs will become
unmanageable and that the health-care consumer's interests will be
left unprotected. 73 Therefore, the need for affirmative action in recognizing, developing and regulating HMOs has become desirable,
and various legislative proposals have attempted to implement this
approach.
A. State Action
In the desire to promote the development of viable HMOs, a
number of states since 19707 have enacted legislation providing for
the establishment and regulation of these organizations. 7 The stat68. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 23, at 175-82.
69. See Note, supra note 4, at 956-57.
70. Id. at 955.
71. See, e.g., AMA v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Group Health Cooperative v.
King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
72. See, e.g., Phelan, supra note 7, at 804.
73. See Holley & Carlson, supra note 4, at 656-57.
74. The predecessor to this current state action is California's Knox-Mills Health Plan
Act enacted in 1965. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12530-39.4 (West Supp. 1974).
75. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1051 to -1068 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 641.17-.38 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62D.01-.29 (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26:21-1 to -39 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 §§ 1551-68 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 56-4101 to -4105 (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-42-1 to -32 (Supp. 1973); 119
CONG. REC. S23431 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1973) (table).
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utes generally regulate certification procedures, fiscal requirements,
provisions of health-care contracts with consumers, prohibited practices such as deceptive solicitation, and violation penalties. A decided minority restrict the establishment of HMOs for profit.76
Some states maintain a reserve requirement,7" although all exempt
HMOs from insurance regulations. Minnesota further provides state
grants to assist nonprofit HMOs. 71 This positive state approach has
one major drawback: a new set of legal hurdles for regional or multistate HMOs could develop due to the varying specific regulations
79
enacted in these states.
B.

FederalAction and Proposals"

The first affirmative actions taken by the federal government
in this area involved the funding of HMOs. In 1971, President Nixon
established a health maintenance organization service in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which by the end of
1972 had distributed approximately twenty-six million dollars in
planning and development grants.8 ' In the 1972 amendments to the
Social Security provisions, Congress extended Medicare payments
to HMO consumers on a prospective per capita basis; 2 under traditional payment procedures,8 Medicare reimbursement to HMOs
was based on the cost of the service, which defeated the incentive
to keep costs low.84 The 1972 amendments define an HMO, in part,
as a public or private prepaid health organization that can reimburse its employee-physicians on a fee-for-service basis. Also, within
three years of the beginning of Medicare payments, at least fifty
percent of an HMO's enrollment must consist of members sixty-five
years or older.8s This assistance, however, was aimed at states favor76. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62D.02(4) (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 1554
(Supp. 1973).
77. See Amz. REy. STAT. ANN. § 20-1056 (Supp. 1973); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12539-39.1
(West Supp. 1974).
78. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62D.26-.29 (Supp. 1974).
79. See 119 CONG. REC. S23430 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1973) (remarks by Senator Javits).
80. See Havighurst, supra note 7, at 781-92; Holley & Carlson, supra note 4, at 668-86;
Note, supra note 4, at 982-1001.
81. See Rothfeld, Sensible Surgery for Swelling Medical Costs, 119 CONG. Rac. S6934,
S6935 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1973).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (Supp. II 1970) (HMOs would get up to 95% of the costs that
a patient would have incurred if he did not go to an HMO).
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f, 1395 1(a) (1970). This provision was first introduced in H.R.
17550, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 239 (1970). See H.R. REP. No. 1096, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 52-55
(1970).
84. See Note, supra note 4, at 988-89.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(b) (Supp. I 1970).
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able to HMOs and existing HMOs, thus providing no incentive for
developing new ones."
In President Nixon's speech to Congress in February, 1971,7 he
called for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to
draft a model act promoting and regulating HMOs for the states to
ratify, which would impose some uniformity in the law. 88 In the
alternative, he proposed that the federal government directly contract with HMOs to provide care for Medicare recipients and other
federal beneficiaries who choose the HMO option, thus preempting
inconsistent state laws through federal contracts.8 9 This latter
method had already been used in Title IV of the Regional Medical
Program Amendments of 1970,90 in which authorized eligible carriers could reimburse nonprofit HMOs for health benefits extended
to federal employees and annuitants." After President Nixon's
speech, other affirmative 2 proposals were offered to overcome state
restrictions and encourage HMO development. One such proposal
combined federal funding with the federal incorporation 3 of HMOs
and suggested regulations to insure efficient, quality care as a condition for the issuance of a certificate of incorporation. 4
The Regional Medical legislation and the proposals which include preemption of restrictive state laws are limited to HMOs
which are funded by the federal government, because the preemption is based on Congressional spending and taxing powers in view
of the general welfare.9" This was the same rationale used in implementing the Social Security system."
86.
87.
88.

See Note, supra note 4, at 993.
117 CONG. REc. 3015 (1971).
Id. at 3017.

89. Id.
90. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-13 (1970) (contained in Historical and Revision Notes) (added
health care benefits for government employees).
91. 5 U.S.C. § 8902 (1970) (contained in Historical and Revision Notes). One article
attempted to interpret the Act as including profit-making HMOs. See Holley & Carlson,
supra note 4, at 663-65.
92. An earlier "negative" proposal to withhold all Medicaid reimbursements and other
federal funds from states with restrictive laws was made by the (McNerney) Task Force on
Medicaid and Related Problems, cited in HMOs as Seen by the AMA-An Analysis, 117
CONG. REC. 47845, 47847 (1971).
93. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 430-32 (1819).
94. H.R. 11728, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1116 (1971), as cited in 117 CONG. REC. 40630
(1971).
95. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
96. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548 (1937); Chapman & Talmadge, Historicaland PoliticalBackground of Federal Health
Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROa. 334, 342-43 (1970); Havighurst, supra note 7, at
783. The federal government has also used the commerce clause in regulating interstate

transportation of foods and drugs and interstate health insurance. See Holley & Carlson,
supra note 4, at 679-80.
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THE 1973 ACT

After many attempts to pass legislation with similar provisions,9" Congress enacted the Health Maintenance Organization Act
of 1973.11 This act authorizes 375 million dollars over a five-year
period99 (section 1309) for the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare to distribute to public or nonprofit private HMO applicants
for the following purposes: (1) grants and contracts for feasibility
studies (section 1303); (2) grants, contracts and loan guarantees for
planning and initial development costs (section 1304); and (3) loans
and loan guarantees for initial operation costs (section 1305). Congress defined a health maintenance organization in section 1301 as
a legal entity that provides health services for a fixed, periodic,
prepaid fee. The fee is based on a community rating system. The
services are provided by "health professionals" of the HMO who
share medical facilities, records, a pooled income, and who may be
physicians, dentists, nurses, podiatrists, optometrists, and others
designated by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The
services must be available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week, and must include inpatient and outpatient hospital services,
mental health treatment, drug and alcohol addiction rehabilitation,
home visits, and preventive health services, among others (section
1302). The HMO must have an open enrollment period of thirty
days during each year and agree that no one will be expelled or
rejected because of his health status. Also, at least one-third of the
policymaking board must be enrollees. Besides regulating the fiscal
operations of an HMO (section 1301 (c)(1)&(2)), defining the type
of population to be enrolled (section 1301(c)(3)), and preparing an
annual report (section 1315), the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, through continuing regulation, can enforce these regu97. See, e.g., H.R. 11728, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 3327, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972); H.R. REP. No. 451, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1973) (list of major bills). This act was a
result of a compromise between S. 14 and H.R. 7974. See S. REP. No. 621, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973). Among the S. 14 provisions deleted by the compromise were: (1) the arbitration
of all malpractice disputes as an option to HMO enrollees; (2) the limitation of an attorney's
contingency fees in arbitration or settlements involving an HMO; and (3) a federal reinsurance program to aid medical malpractice insurance companies. See S. REP. No. 129, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 47-55, 84-85, 88-90 (1973); Morris, HMO (Horrendous Malpractice
Obituary), 39 INs. CouN. J. 518, 522-24, 526-31 (1972).
98. Pub. L. No. 93-222 (Dec. 29, 1973), 87 Stat. 914, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.
(1970), as printed in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5129.
99. Originally there was a much larger commitment to HMO development. See S. 3327,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ($5.1 billion); S. 14, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ($805 million)
(figures cited in 118 CONG. REc. S14384 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1972) (remarks by Senator Kennedy) and 119 CONG. REC. S23430 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1973) (remarks by Senator Javits)
respectively).
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lations against HMOs assisted under the act (section 1312). The act
in section 1310 also provides another incentive for HMO development by requiring all employers of twenty-five persons or more who
pay the federal minimum wage to give employees in the company's
health benefit plan the option to join an HMO."
Of particular importance is section 1311, which provides for the
preemption of all restrictive state laws that affect HMOs receiving
assistance under the act. 0 ' Section 1311 specifically preempts all
state laws that (1) require medical society-approved HMOs; (2)
require an HMO governing board consisting of all or a percentage
of physicians; (3) require that all or a percentage of local physicians
participate or have the option to participate in an HMO; (4) require
the imposition of insurance regulations respecting initial capitalization and financial reserves; or (5) prohibit proper advertising for
soliciting HMO enrollees. Thus, an affirmative legal atmosphere
has been created by the federal government for the development of
the HMO concept as an alternative to the traditional fee-for-service
approach.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Faced with a national health crisis, Congress responded by providing financial support for HMO development and attacking restrictive state laws through preemption. This method appears to be
a constitutional application of the congressional spending power for
the general welfare, preempting specific, repugnant state laws
through the supremacy clause.0 2 By specifically describing which
restrictive laws are preempted, however, Congress may have been
too restrictive. For example, the provision fails to mention restrictive licensure statutes, although these restraints greatly affect an
HMO's efficiency through the use of its labor force." 3 No catchall
clause is included to cover restrictive laws not specifically mentioned. Preemption of these laws could be accomplished possibly
100. It appears that the authority for this provision is the commerce clause and the
regulation of interstate commerce employees through the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970), as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 213 (Supp. 111970). See text
in note 96 supra.
101. H.R. 7974 did not contain a preemption provision. See H.R. RP. No. 451, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973).
102. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI. The Supreme Court determines the extent of preemption of
state laws by the congressional intent evidenced in the particular act. See EGISLATIWV REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONsTITUnON OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 808-09 (1964). For problems with nonspecific preemption see Holley & CARLsoN, supra note 4, at 665.
103. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION,
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based on the general purpose of the act as evidenced by the definition of "health professionals," which includes personnel approved
by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (section 1301
(b)(3)(B)). This nonspecific approach invites court interpretation,
however, and therefore weakens the preemptive force of the Act.
Among other restraints not mentioned is the corporate practice rule
that still plagues profit-making HMOs tremendously. °4 It is apparent from the Act's definition of an HMO as a "public or nonprofit
private entity" and the absence of this type of restraint in the
preemption provision that the Act does not include assistance for
profit-making HMOs. This is surprising since Congress has recognized that a major roadblock to the development of HMOs as viable
health-care providers always has been the need for investment capital. Profit-making HMOs would be uniquely capable of attracting
the necessary capital from private investors, and yet Congress has
failed in this Act to assist them financially and protect them from
restrictive state laws and practices. As shown by the regulations
contained in this Act, profit-making HMOs could be controlled to
the satisfaction of those who fear the profit motive in health care.,0 5
This federal approach does not fully achieve its goal of overcoming state restrictions and encouraging HMO development.
Preemption protection is limited to those HMOs able to qualify
under this provision; therefore, nonqualifiers will be subject to restrictive laws. Thus it appears that a better approach, albeit a
slower one, is the drafting of a model act for state ratification. Such
an act would avoid sharply conflicting state statutes, even if
amended slightly upon ratification, that would permit the development of regional or multistate HMOs. A model act, well-drafted and
sufficiently comprehensive, truly could assist the HMO concept in
both its profit and nonprofit forms.
Nevertheless, under the existing statute Congress has attempted by legislation to encourage the development of HMOs as a
viable alternative for the health-care consumer. As is often the case
in the political world of Congress, the fanfare accompanying a legislative response has obscured the deficiencies of the answer. This act
with its limited appropriations, restricted preemption language,
and failure to support profit-making HMOs constitutes an experimental approach to the HMO concept, and therefore, only illusionary support for its development.
MARK J. MATHIESEN
104.
105.

See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
See Havighurst, supra note 7, at 748-59.

